Punitive Damages - Strict Products Liability - \u3cem\u3eErie\u3c/em\u3e Doctrine by Weiler, William A.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 25 Number 2 Article 9 
1987 
Punitive Damages - Strict Products Liability - Erie Doctrine 
William A. Weiler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William A. Weiler, Punitive Damages - Strict Products Liability - Erie Doctrine, 25 Duq. L. Rev. 365 (1987). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol25/iss2/9 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES-STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY-Erie Doc-
TRINE-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has affirmed that puni-
tive damages are not available to a plaintiff in a strict products
liability action in Pennsylvania, raising an Erie doctrine conflict
with decisions by Federal District Courts sitting in Pennsylvania.
Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088
(1985).
Joseph Edward Martin was employed by Industrial Furnace
Supplies, Inc., for thirty-nine years; during that time, he installed
asbestos thermal insulation.1 On August 16, 1978,2 Martin filed a
complaint against his employer and eleven asbestos insulation
manufacturers for compensatory and punitive damages for asbes-
tosis and related injuries he claimed developed while installing the
products made and distributed by the various defendants.
3
The jury awarded Martin $67,000.00 in compensatory damages.
4
However, the trial court determined that the evidence Martin of-
fered at trial was insufficient to support his request for punitive
damages, and on its own discretion, removed the issue of punitive
damages from the jury's consideration.5 After the trial, Martin's
motion for a new trial was denied. Martin appealed, claiming error
in the rejection of his motions for a new trial.6 The Superior Court
reversed and remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of dam-
ages, for, among other reasons, refusing to submit his claim for pu-
nitive damages to the jury.7 The Superior Court held that the evi-
dence was sufficient to show the defendant's outrageous conduct,8
1. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 508 Pa 154, 166, 494 A.2d 1088, 1095 (1985).
2. Id. at 162, 494 A.2d at 1092. Martin died August 1, 1982. Id. at n.3.
3. Id. at 162, 494 A.2d at 1092.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Martin argued that the trial court erred in: (1) excluding evidence that he might
develop bronchogenic (lung) cancer as a result of his exposure; (2) instructing the jury that
it could reduce its award of damages to reflect the amount of harm attributed to his ciga-
rette smoking; (3) refusing to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury; and (4)
refusing to admit certain medical exhibits into evidence. 322 Pa. Super. 348, 353, 469 A.2d
655, 657 (1983).
7. 508 Pa. at 162, 494 A.2d at 1093.
8. Outrageous conduct is a necessary requirement of punitive damages. See Chambers
v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 344, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (1963).
In Chambers, the plaintiff broke his hip while attempting to avoid an assault by the de-
fendant. The jury awarded the plaintiff punitive damages. The Pennsylvania Supreme
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and therefore, the issue of punitive damages was improperly kept
from the jury's consideration.'
The defendant manufacturers appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling
that the evidence did not prove the recklessly indifferent conduct
which would permit a jury to award punitive damages.' 0 As such, it
was not necessary to decide whether Martin could seek punitive
damages in a products liability action premised solely on a strict
liability theory.1"
Justice Hutchinson, writing for the majority, began his analysis
with a discussion as to the evidence that was introduced by Martin
at the trial court level. The testimony proffered by Martin at the
trial court level showed that there was a general risk of harm wher-
ever asbestos was used; however, this risk was proven to be mini-
mal to those persons who installed finished asbestos products in
direct contrast to production personnel who worked with raw as-
bestos in manufacturing situations. 2
Justice Hutchinson then considered the standards for awarding
punitive damages, and the propriety of such an award under the
facts of the principle case. Under Pennsylvania law, punitive dam-
ages are awarded to punish and to deter outrageous conduct, such
as acts committed with reckless disregard for the rights of others. 3
Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages, as the injuries were
caused by a freak accident rather than the intention of the defendant to inflict bodily in-
jury. Id. at 345, 192 A.2d at 355.
9. 508 Pa. at 162, 494 A.2d at 1093.
10. Id. at 162, 494 A.2d at 1092 citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1979).
Pennsylvania adopted § 402A in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
Section 908 of the Restatement states that punitive damages may be awarded only where
the defendant's conduct is outrageous. The defendant must act with gross negligence or
reckless indifference to the rights of others, to be outrageous.
Under § 402A, strict liability is imposed on certain classes of defendants when they have
acted without negligence. As long as the plaintiff was injured, the defendant is strictly lia-
ble. Punitive damages, however, may be imposed only if the defendant was recklessly negli-
gent. Since strict liability precludes negligence, punitive damages are not available under
such claims.
11. 508 Pa. at 165-66, 494 A.2d at 1094. The product manufacturers argued two other
issues which are not discussed in this Note. They were that the trial judge properly excluded
testimony by experts regarding the likelihood of Martin's contracting lung cancer, and that
if this evidence was improperly withheld from the jury's consideration, the case should be
remanded for a new trial on all issues. The Supreme Court ruled that the expert testimony
was properly excluded, which rendered the defendant's request for a new trial on all the
issues moot.
12. Id. at 175 n.15, 494 A.2d at 1100 n.15.
13. Id. at 169, 494 A.2d at 1096. The quality of the evidence did not warrant the
court's consideration of "either the broad policy arguments or the legal theory...for or
Recent Decisions
As applied by Pennsylvania courts, punitive damages need not be
awarded for acts of negligence, such as "inadvertance, mistake or
errors of judgment,"1 ' nor where the defendant is grossly
negligent.
15
Pennsylvania courts diverge from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts as to what actions constitute reckless disregard for the rights
of others. The Restatement describes two situations which warrant
a finding of recklessness: (1) when the actor knows that his actions,
if carried out in conscious disregard or indifference to a known
risk, will probably lead to the injury of another; and (2) when the
actor has knowledge but does not appreciate or realize the risk of
his actions, although a reasonable man would have appreciated or
realized such risks.'6 The Martin court concluded, however, that
only the former situation would support an award of punitive dam-
ages in Pennsylvania because the latter situation does not demon-
strate the necessary degree of culpability. 17 As conduct amounting
to reckless disregard with respect to another's rights cannot be
found where an actor fails to appreciate the high degree of risk
associated with such conduct, an award of punitive damages was
not justified in the principle case, wherein the actor's conduct
amounted only to gross negligence.' 8
Justice Hutchinson then discussed two federal diversity cases re-
lied upon by Martin in support of his punitive damages claim. The
first case considered, Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Inc.,' e was
held by the Martin court to be distinguishable on the facts.20 In
against the allowance of punitive damages in litigation involving mass marketed products."
Id. at 166, 494 A.2d at 1094.
14. Id. at 170, 494 A.2d at 1097. Martin relied principally on the testimony of Jerome
F. Wiot, M.D., a radiology specialist, and of Thomas F. Mancuso, M.D., an expert in occupa-
tional health.
15. Id. at 170-71, 494 A.2d at 1097.
16. Id. at 171, 494 A.2d at 1097. These principles are set forth in § 908(2) of the Re-
statement. The Restatement reads as follows:
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing
punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defend-
ant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused
or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
17. 508 Pa. at 171, 494 A.2d at 1097, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
comment b (1979).
18. Id. at 172, 494 A.2d at 1098.
19. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
20. 508 Pa. at 174-75, 494 A.2d at 1099-1100. Section 500 of the Restatement describes
reckless conduct as occurring in situations:
1987
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Neal, the plaintiff's expert witness had presented well-documented
evidence concerning the adverse effects of prolonged exposure to
raw asbestos on workers in manufacturing situations.21 In Martin,
however, the same expert witness testified that the health risks to
installers of finished asbestos products, while less substantiated,
appeared to be much less serious. 2 Justice Hutchinson concluded
that the employer's failure to warn his employees of the risks inci-
dent to their employment in Neal was an act of reckless disregard
in the face of a known danger. However, since Martin's employer
had no knowledge as to how prolonged exposure to finished asbes-
tos products would affect an installer's health, there was no act
done which could rise to the level of reckless indifference, and no
punitive damages were justified.
2 3
The second case relied upon by Martin was Hoffman v. Sterling
Drug, Inc.24 In Hoffman, the defendant marketed a drug used to
control the buildup of cholesterol in blood 2 5 During testing of the
drug, the defendant manufacturer discovered that short term use
would cause users to suffer cataracts and eventual blindness.26 This
adverse side effect was purposely hidden from the Food and Drug
Administration (hereinafter FDA), as well as the physicians who
tested the drug, during the FDA's approval process.2 7 The defend-
ant placed the drug on the market, representing that the drug was
(1) where the "actor knows or has reason to know,. . of facts which create a high
degree of physical harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to act,
in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk"; and
(2) where the "actor has such knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, but does not
realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man in
his position would do so."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
21. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In Neal, twenty-four former employees of Carey
sued the corporation, a manufacturing and mining concern, for failure to warn of the dan-
gers of inhaling raw asbestos fibers. The plaintiffs claimed that this led to their developing
asbestosis (a form of lung cancer). The manufacturer had been warned by Dr. Mancuso that
prolonged exposure could cause cancer, but the defendant took no action in response to the
recommendation. 508 Pa. at 174-75, 494 A.2d at 1099.
22. 508 Pa. at 175 n.15, 494 A.2d at 1099 n.15.
23. Id. at 175, 494 A.2d at 1099-1100.
24. 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973).
25. Id.
26. Id. The duty to warn about an inherently dangerous product extends to all who
use the product, according to § 402A of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1982). This duty arises, however, only when the inherent dangerousness of the prod-
uct is known. Since Dr. Mancuso testified in Martin that the dangers were unknown, the




safe.28 Because of this active misrepresentation, the Hoffman court
held there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to hear the pu-
nitive damages issue.29 Justice Hutchinson held that Martin's evi-
dence was insufficient to support giving the issue of punitive dam-
ages to the jury.30 Martin, unlike the plaintiff in Hoffman, neither
argued nor offered evidence that his employer knew of the dangers
that "asbestos insulation workers faced and, nevertheless, acted or
failed to act in flagrant disregard of their safety.
''sl
In a concurring opinion, Justice McDermott indicated his belief
that Pennsylvania followed Section 500 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts in its entirety.
3
In support of the proposition that punitive damages may be
awarded even when an actor proceeds without realizing the magni-
tude of the risk of harm incident to such conduct, Justice McDer-
mott cited Fugagli v. Camasi,3s wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that wanton misconduct exists where an actor failed to
realize the dangerous nature of a particular situation, though a rea-
sonable man would have realized such danger, yet acted in the face
of the unknown danger.34 Fugagli was relied on to impose punitive
damages in Focht v. Rabada,3 5 wherein a defendant was held liable
for injuries proximately caused by his drunk driving.3 6 The judg-
ment and the punitive damages awarded by the jury in Focht were
upheld by the Superior Court, based upon the reasoning that the
possibility of risk and the probability of harm were so great "that
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 508 Pa. at 177, 494 A.2d at 1100.
31. Id. at 176, 494 A.2d at 1100.
32. Id. at 178, 494 A.2d at 1101 (McDermott, J., concurring).
33. 426 Pa. 1, 229 A.2d 735(1967).
34. The Martin court concluded that the insufficiency of Martin's evidence was again
the differentiating factor. Martin, unlike Hoffman, never argued nor offered evidence that
the defendants knew the dangers "asbestos insulation workers faced, and, nevertheless, ac-
ted or failed to act in flagrant disregard of their safety." 508 Pa. at 176, 494 A.2d at 1100.
The court then vacated the judgment of the superior court, and remanded for its determi-
nation of whether the trial court's jury instructions properly instructed the jury that it could
consider Martin's cigarette smoking as a contributing factor to his illness which could re-
duce his damages award. Id. at 177-78, 494 A.2d 1101.
35. 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 147 (1970).
36. In Fugagli, the plaintiff's decedent was killed when thrown from the defendant's
car when the defendant lost control of his vehicle on a curve. Evidence showed that the
defendant was driving while intoxicated at over 90 mph when the accident occurred. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that wanton misconduct occurs when an actor inten-
tionally proceeds in an unreasonable manner, in disregard of a risk which was known, or
should have been, and that the risk was so great that it was "highly probable that harm
would follow." 426 Pa. at 3, 329 A.2d at 736.
1987
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outrageous misconduct [was] established without reference to mo-
tive or intent.
'37
Justice McDermott criticized the majority's decision in Martin
as being a direct contradiction of the Court's holding in Feld v.
Merriam. a In Feld, the court held that punitive damages are
"based on conduct which is 'malicious' 'wanton' 'reckless' 'willful'
or 'oppressive'." 39 Since Justice McDermott believed that the Mar-
tin decision held that wanton conduct would not support a puni-
tive damages claim, he concurred in the result only."0
The awarding of punitive damages in strict liability actions is a
recent development in this country. In Toole v. Richardon-Merrill,
Inc.,"' the plaintiff brought suit to recover damages caused by the
defendant's product, a prescription drug known as triparanol.'2
The plaintiff developed cataracts in both eyes, which eventually
required the removal of the lenses from the plaintiff's eyes. In ad-
dition, the plaintiff was rendered highly susceptible to detached
retinas, which increased the plaintiff's risk of blindness.' The
plaintiff brought suit under four alternative theories of recovery:
fraud and deceit; breach of express warranty; failure to warn under
strict liability principles; and failure to properly prepare, a second
strict liability theory." The trial court found that sufficient evi-
dence was introduced to justify giving the issue of punitive dam-
ages to the jury.' 5 In his appeal to the California Court of Appeals,
the defendant in Toole asserted that the punitive damages claim
should have been dismissed,'4 and that the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity was inapplicable to the sale of unadulterated and uncontami-
37. Id.
It is not necessary for the tortfeasor to have actual knowledge of the other person's
peril to constitute wanton misconduct. Such exists if he has knowledge of sufficient
facts to cause a reasonable man to realize the existing danger for a sufficient period of
time beforehand to give him a reasonable opportunity to take means to avoid the
danger and, despite this knowledge, he recklessly ignores the other person's peril.
Id.
38. 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
39. Id. at 395, 485 A.2d at 747-48.
40. 508 Pa. at 179, 494 A.2d at 1102 (McDermott, J., concurring).
41. 251 Cal. App.2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
42. Id. at 695, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403. Triparanol is a drug used to inhibit cholesterol
production in the blood stream. It was believed to aid in the prevention of heart attacks and
strokes caused by arteriosclerosis, commonly known as hardening of the arteries.
43. Id. The plaintiff also suffered minor side effects such as hair loss and skin rashes.
44. Id. at 703, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
45. Id. at 696, 60 Cal. Rptr at 403. The jury awarded $175,000.00 compensatory dam-




nated prescription drugs.4 Citing comment k of section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter Restatement),
which discusses unavoidably unsafe products, the defendant ar-
gued that properly prepared products, accompanied by proper la-
bels and warnings, cannot warrant the imposition of strict liability
standards."
The Toole court, in an opinion written by Judge Saloman, held
that the Restatement did not apply because the evidence showed
that the product had not been ".... properly labeled in that it did
not give adequate warning of its inherent danger. ' '4 9 The failure to
warn the FDA that long-term use of the drug could lead to severe
eye problems was held to support the court's ruling. 0 In support of
its reasoning, the Toole court relied on Gottsdanker v. Cutter Lab-
oratories51 as authority for holding the defendant liable under
strict liability standards. In Gottsdanker, the defendant was held
strictly liable because the vaccine manufactured by the defendant
was improperly manufactured, as the vaccine caused the very dis-
ease (polio) that it was specifically designed to prevent.
52
In California, as in Pennsylvania, punitive damages are permissi-
47. 251 Cal. App.2d at 708, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
48. Id. Comment (k) discusses unavoidably unsafe products. It reads:
(k) Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the dis-
ease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in partic-
ular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or
perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The
seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared
and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desira-
ble product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 402A comment k (1979).
49. Id. at 709, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
50. Id.
51. 182 Cal. App.2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
52. Id. at 605, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 322. The vaccine was not wholesome as it contained live
and active poliomyelitis virus.
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ble where there is a showing that the defendant's negligent act was
willful, intentional and done in reckless disregard of the act's pos-
sible consequences. 3 The Toole court dismissed the defendant's
claim that a showing must be made that the defendant intended to
harm a specific plaintiff, stating that malice in fact can be proved
by showing that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the
rights of others."4 If the evidence supports this, malice in fact may
be found by the jury.55 The Toole court found the requisite mali-
ciousness in the marketing of the drug with the knowledge of its
serious side effects, the intentional misrepresentation to the FDA
and prescribing physicians that the drug was safe, and the disre-
gard of outside evidence that the drug was causing blindness in
test animals and humans."
Although the evidence in Toole was held to warrant the imposi-
tion of punitive damages, the decision should not be applied as ap-
proval for the proposition that punitive damages may be awarded
in an action premised solely on strict liability. In Gottsdanker, the
request for punitive damages was never raised by the plaintiff. The
only damages received were pecuniary damages for breach of im-
plied warranty, a strict liability claim. 7 In addition, a special inter-
rogatory to the jury showed that the Gottsdanker plaintiff was not
negligent: "The jury drew a thoughtful and careful statement...
and had from a preponderance of the evidence concluded that the
defendant . . . was not negligent.
' '58
To be sure, the Toole court was well-versed in the facts and de-
cision of Gottsdanker. As Gottsdanker did not allow punitive dam-
ages, it seems apparent that if the Toole court concluded that the
jury's imposition of punitive damages was based on either of the
two strict liability theories presented at trial, the court would have
had to either overrule Gottsdanker or overturn the jury's award of
punitive damages. The Toole court did neither, which implies that
the court concluded that the punitive damages arose from either of
the negligence claims.
This rejection of Toole as authority for granting punitive dam-
ages in a strict products liability action is strengthened by the fact
that Justice Saloman's opinion states that "[i]t was made clear to
53. 251 Cal. App.2d at 711, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 713, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416.




the jury that the plaintiff in the action had the burden of proof
with regard to punitive damages on such issues as fraud . ..and
malice."5 9 This statement reinforces the fact that the court be-
lieved that the punitive damages were awarded on negligence theo-
ries. Finally, it is important to note that the verdict in Gott-
sdanker was general, and that no interrogatories were given to the
jury to explain their decision. This is inferred from Justice
Saloman's statement that "since the jury was instructed only on
malice as a foundation for an award of punitive damages ...we
must presume they found malice in fact."60 Since California ad-
heres to section 908 of the Restatement, and punitive damages
"may be awarded because of. . .reckless indifference . . . or mal-
ice, . . . and are not awarded for. . . ordinary negligence,"' it is
safe to assume that punitive damages were not awarded in Toole
because of a breach of strict products liability standards. There-
fore, Toole should not be seriously entertained as authority for
awarding punitive damages as such.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylva-
nia law, has recently begun to allow the award of punitive damages
in products liability actions. This matter was first addressed in
Hoffman v. Sterling Drugs, Inc.2  In Hoffman, the plaintiff was
prescribed the drug chloroquine phosphate by several physicians
over an eight year period.6 a The physicians were familiar with the
fact that chloroquine-based compounds sometimes produced
blurred vision, but that this side effect resided whenever treatment
was suspended; however, none knew that the damage suffered by
the plaintiff was possible. 4 In 1965, after eight years of treatment,
59. Id. at 716, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
60. Id. at 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1979).
62. 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 135. This was done to control the plaintiff's illness known as lupus er-
ythematosis. Lupus is a serious, often fatal, disease accompanied by various lesions (inju-
ries) in the viscera (organs), skin eruptions, fever, and other symptoms. Pathologically it is
characterized by abnormal changes in the connective tissues, especially of the arterioles
(small arteries). The organs and tissues primarily involved are the kidneys, the spleen, and
the endocardium (the inner lining of the heart). The condition is also marked by the pres-
ence of lupus erythematosus cells, abnormal leukocytes containing ingested nuclei of other
cells that have been damaged. These cells are found in the blood and bone marrow, and
their presence (detected by laboratory procedures) is helpful in the diagnosis of the disease.
The outstanding clinical signs include weakness, fatigability, arthritis resembling rheuma-
toid arthritis, redness of the skin in patches (on the face, neck and arms), pericarditis, pleu-
risy, swelling of the lymph nodes, anemia, etc. The familiar butterfly patch may or may not
be present. Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine, vol. 2, pg. L-121 (1983).
64. 485 F.2d at 135.
1987
374 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 25:365
the plaintiff's eyesight deteriorated until the plaintiff was legally
blind in both eyes. 5 It was discovered that the plaintiff was suffer-
ing from chloroquine retinopathy66 from the prolonged use of the
drug. The evidence at trial showed that chloroquine was intro-
duced in the mid-1940's as a cure for malaria. By 1953, it was es-
tablished that chloroquine, used in greater quantity than required
for malaria treatment, was successful in controlling arthritis and
lupus as well.6 7 The defendant filed a supplemental application
with the FDA for approval to sell chloroquine as a treatment for
lupus; the application was conditionally approved three weeks
later.6 ' By 1957, it was suspected that chloroquine sulfate, which
was not manufactured by the defendant, could cause permanent
eye damage taken in the higher doses lupus required. A 1959 re-
port concluded that chloroquine phosphate, which the defendant
manufactured, had not been tested; therefore, there was no proof
of the comparative toxity levels of the two compounds. 9 The de-
fendants did, however, send letters and information to physicians
warning them of the severe "ocular complications from [prolonged]
use [of chloroquine phosphate] ...and of the need for . . . peri-
odic examinations." 70
In filing a four-count complaint, the plaintiff in Hoffman
charged the defendant with: negligent failure to properly test the
drug prior to marketing, strict liability in tort under section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, reckless fraud and misrepre-
sentation, and breach of express and implied warranties. 7' During
the trial, the plaintiff moved to include the issue of punitive dam-
65. Id. Pennsylvania law defines legally blind as 10/200 uncorrected vision. Id.
66. Id. Chloroquine retinopathy is a non-inflammatory eye disease affecting the retina,
marked by degenerative wasting of the retina, caused from overdoses of chloroquine-based
drugs. Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine, vol. 3, pg. R-160 (1983).
67. 485 F.2d at 136.
68. Id. Final approval was obtained on October 2, 1957.
69. Chloroquine was introduced in the late 1940's as a treatment for malaria. While
causing mild side effects, these disappeared after use was discontinued. In the middle
1950's, it was discovered that the drug, given in significantly larger doses, could be success-
fully used to treat rheumatoid arthritis and lupus erythematosus. In 1959, it was docu-
mented that chloroquine sulfate would cause severe eye damage similar to that suffered by
the plaintiff. Sterling Drugs, however, was marketing chloroquine phosphate, a drug unt-
ested in the 1959 report. The report noted, significantly, that chloroquine phosphate "might
have an entirely different toxity than chloroquine sulfate." 485 F.2d at 136. (quoting Hobbs,
Sordy and Freedman, Retinopathy Following Chloroquine Treatment, LANCET Vol. 1, pgs.
478-80 (1959)).
70. 485 F.2d at 137.
71. Id. at 134-35. The trial court dismissed the breach of warranty claim prior to trial,
and it was not a subject of the appeal. Id. at 135 n.3.
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ages for the jury's consideration; the motion was denied.7 2 The.
jury, charged only on the plaintiff's negligence and strict liability
claims, awarded compensatory damages; the defendant's motion
for a new trial, and the plaintiff's motion for a new trial restricted
to the issue of punitive damages, were denied. 3
On appeal, Judge Biggs presented the opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.74 Discussing the punitive damages
claim, Judge Biggs held that the plaintiff's motion to amend his
complaint to include punitive damages should have been allowed.7 5
In assessing the evidence, the court concluded that "Count IV...
if proven, would support such an award. '76 Count IV alleged fraud
and misrepresentation in concealing the knowledge of the drug's
safety. In reasoning that the evidence was sufficient to support
such an award, the Hoffman court held that the jury "should have
been allowed to decide whether the warnings issued were so inade-
quate as to constitute a reckless disregard of the danger to the
public of irreversible retinal damage."' 7 The fact that there was
appropriate information available to the defendant, prior to the
plaintiff's treatment, was sufficient to support Hoffman's claim
that the manufacturer knew that the drug, in large doses, caused
retinal damage, and failed to warn against this possibility strongly
enough, if at all.78 Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial
on the issue of punitive damages.
The Hoffman decision formed the Third Circuit's basis for al-
lowing punitive damages in a strict liability action. In Thomas v.
American Cystoscope Makers, Inc.,79 a federal district court apply-
ing Pennsylvania law again had the opportunity to consider
whether an award of punitive damages should be allowed in a
72. Id. at 135.
73. Id.
74. The court began by holding that there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue
of negligence to the jury. Interpreting Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 283 A.2d 206 (1971),
the Hoffman court dismissed the defendant's claim that there is no duty to warn "treating"
physicians of a drug's dangers, as opposed to "prescribing" physicians. Judge Biggs con-
tended that Incollingo required a warning to the physician community in general, and but-
tressed this opinion with the holding in Thomas v. Arvon Products Co., 424 Pa. 365, 370,
227 A.2d 897, 900 (1967), where the court ruled that "every reasonable precaution" ought to
be taken to warn consumers of a drug's danger, and that this required a warning to all
physicians in general. 485 F.2d at 142.
75. Id. at 145.
76. Id. at 144.
77. Id. at 146.
78. Id.
79. 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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strict products liability action °.8 In Thomas, the plaintiff, a physi-
cian, was injured when a cystoscope he was using in performing
surgery short-circuited.and burned his right cornea." The cysto-
scope was sold with two eyepieces; an insulated eyepiece for view-
ing with the naked eye, and an uninsulated eyepiece specifically
designed for use with photographic equipment. The plaintiff was
using the uninsulated eyepiece when the accident occurred." The
plaintiff noticed during the operation that the cystoscope was be-
coming warm, and was emitting mild electrical shocks. Despite the
fact that the warming effect was something that the plaintiff had
never experienced before, he continued using the equipment. An
electrical current passed from the eyepiece into the plaintiff's eye,
causing the injury.
83
The action in Thomas was tried solely on a theory of strict prod-
uct liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The gravamen of the complaint was that the product was
unreasonably unsafe, and should have been designed with an insu-
lated photographic eyepiece. The plaintiff's reasoning was that the
defendant should have foreseen the type of misuse of the product
which caused the plaintiff's injury. 4 Alternatively, the plaintiff
claimed that the unreasonable dangerousness of the product
should have required the defendant to warn consumers against
foreseeable hazards.83 The jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory
and punitive damages. The defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.
on the issue of punitive damages was granted.86 Judge Davis, writ-
ing for the district court, confirmed the general availability of pu-
nitive damages in Pennsylvania, citing Chambers v. Montgomery
87
and Hoffman as authority for the proposition that punitive dam-
ages are available in a strict product liability action under Pennsyl-
vania law.
88
In examining the evidence, the Thomas court concluded that
80. Id. at 259.
81. Id. A cystoscope is an electrical fiber-optic microscope used to view inside the
body through a very small incision. Id.




86. Id. at 267.
87. Id. at 261, citing Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355 (1963). See
supra note 8 and accompanying text.




there was insufficient evidence to prove the "recklessness" which
Pennsylvania, in applying section 500 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, uses as its standard.8 9 Judge Davis stated that the court
"[could] not say that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate
that subjective kind of awareness that is the distinguishing ele-
ment of reckless conduct." 90 The court concluded by noting that
"we take it as established, by virtue of the [Pennsylvania courts']
tacit approval of the punitive damage claim on appeal in Hoffman
. . . that there is no per se preclusion against awarding punitive
damages where, as here, strict liability under section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts was introduced as the plaintiff's
theory of liability." '
The Thomas court's reliance on Hoffman for the proposition
that punitive damages may be awarded in a strict liability action is
unwarranted. During the new trial on the issue of punitive dam-
ages in Hoffman, the court discussed the relationship between pu-
nitive damages and section 402A of the Restatement.2 Judge Her-
man, writing for the Hoffman II court, noted that section 402A of
the Restatement was meant to protect all consumers from a partic-
ular type of harm, whereas section 908 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts limits punitive damages to the particular plaintiff
harmed.9 3 As section 908 requires that malice or recklessness be
directed at one particular plaintiff, the Hoffman II court stated
that "this court finds it inconceivable that in a products liability
case the defendant could be shown to have a single consumer in
mind when producing the particular item." 9 Judge Herman con-
cluded that allowing a jury to award punitive damages on a strict
product liability theory would be "well beyond the limited confines
89. 414 F. Supp. at 266.
90. Id. at 267.
91. Id. at 264 n.13.
92. 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
93. Id. at 856. Section 908 reads:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing
punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defend-
ant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused
or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
94. 374 F. Supp at 856.
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of § 402A.""' As the Hoffman II court confirms that awarding pu-
nitive damages in a strict product liability action would be con-
trary to Pennsylvania law, the Thomas court's opposite conclusion
improperly interprets Pennsylvania law.
The allowing of punitive damages under perceived Pennsylvania
law continued in Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd.,"' wherein
the plaintiffs brought an action against their former employer, and
various suppliers of raw asbestos to their employer, for injuries
sustained from prolonged asbestos exposure.9 7 The plaintiffs'
causes of action were in negligence and strict product liability,
under sections 388 and 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
for failure to warn about the dangers of the product.9 8
The defendant suppliers claimed their duty to warn was
superceded by the manufacturer's knowledge of the dangerous na-
ture of the product." Citing the Pennsylvania case Berkebile v.
Brantley Helicopter Corp.,100 the Neal court held that under sec-
tion 402A, the duty to warn the ultimate consumer or user exists to
make the inherently dangerous product nondefective, and that the
duty to warn was nondelegable.10 1 The court also held that by sec-
tion 388, the plaintiffs in Neal were the ultimate consumers of the
asbestos products to whom a duty to warn was owed.1 2
95. Id. at 856 and n.4.
96. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
97. Id. at 365.
98. Id. at 368-69. Section 388 reads:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is
subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with
the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is
or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason
to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous
condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
99. 548 F. Supp. at 368-69.
100. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
101. 548 F. Supp. at 368-69. The defendants pointed to Toppi v. U.S., 332 F. Supp.
513 (E.D. Pa. 1971) and Lockett v. General Electric Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
as requiring no duty to warn when the employer has independent knowledge of the hazard
of the product. Toppi and Lockett were distinguished by Judge Becktle. He stated that
both cases dealt with products where the inherent dangers were readily apparent; thus, no
warning was necessary. 548 F. Supp. at 369. In Neal, however, asbestos danger was held not
readily apparent to the user in the absence of an adequate warning; therefore, by section
388 plaintiffs were entitled to a warning about the dangers of asbestos exposure. Id.
102. 548 F. Supp. at 369, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
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The Neal case went to the jury under both the strict liability
and the negligence claims. Upon a judgment for the plaintiffs
awarding compensatory and punitive damages, the defendant sup-
pliers requested judgment n.o.v. on the punitive damages award. 10 3
They contended that the evidence presented was insufficient to
support the punitive damage claim;"" therefore, the issue should
have been withheld from the jury's consideration. The court de-
nied the motion, stating that testimony by one of the defendant
supplier's own medical personnel showed that the suppliers knew
of the health hazards of asbestos inhalation in the late 1940's, yet
failed to place warnings on their products for almost twenty
years.1
0 5
The defendants in Neal also contended that punitive damages
were incompatible with a strict products liability action because
strict products liability looks to the defectiveness of the product
while punitive damages look to the defendants' conduct. 10 6 Judge
Bechtle, citing Thomas, held that where the conduct of the de-
fendant is outrageous in light of the injuries received by the plain-
tiff, punitive damages could be awarded.
1 7
Finally, the defendants claimed that punitive damages should
not be permitted because they would lead to financial ruin for the
defendant, by having to pay excessive awards. 0 8 Judge Bechtle,
citing section 908 and the Pennsylvania case Givens v. W.J. Gil-
more Drugs,09 stated that corporate entities would be protected
from excessive awards, because the award must bear a reasonable
relationship to the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff." 0 For
these reasons, the motion for judgment n.o.v. was denied.
The decision in Neal is a classic example of a federal court deci-
sion being incorrectly interpreted with respect to its application of
Pennsylvania law. Since Neal went to the jury on both negligence
and strict liability claims, it is conceivable that the jury awarded
punitive damages based on the plaintiff's negligence claim only.
The discussion of the case by Judge Bechtle conclusively shows
that the punitive damages were awarded, in the court's opinion, for
103. 548 F. Supp. at 368.
104. Id. at 374 and N.T. 23.57.
105. Id. at 376.
106. Id. at 377.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 376.
109. 377 Pa. 278, 10 A.2d 12 (1940).
110. 548 F. Supp. at 377.
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the defendant's breach of section 388 of the Restatement, which
discusses a negligent failure to warn about the product's inherently
dangerous character. As Judge Bechtle states, "Punitive damages
are a recoverable item of relief [if] . . . the defendant [acted] with
'outrageous' and . . . reckless indifference to the rights of that
plaintiff." '' Section 500 of the Restatement discusses reckless in-
difference in terms of "reasonable" behavior, 2 while section 402A
does not even require a showing that the defendant was negli-
gent.11 3 It would appear to be inconsistent to allow an award for
punitive damages under a section of the Restatement requiring no
reckless indifference for it to be violated, while the Restatement
specifically requires reckless indifference before punitive damages
can be awarded.
In light of the aforementioned analysis, the results reached by
the courts in Toole, Hoffman I and Thomas cannot be cited for the
proposition that punitive damages may be awarded in an action
grounded solely upon strict liability claims. The Toole court lim-
ited the issue of punitive damages to the plaintiff's negligence
claim of fraud and malice. Hoffman II dismissed the applicability
of punitive damages to a strict liability claim in the court's analysis
upon remand. Similarly, in Thomas, the strict liability issue was
removed from the jury's consideration, precluding the notion that
a strict liability claim will support a request for punitive damages.
The Thomas court admitted that the issue of whether punitive
damages could be received in a strict product liability action "ap-
pears not to have been raised or ruled upon directly by the Penn-
sylvania courts or by any court interpreting Pennsylvania law""";
even so, the Thomas court "[took] it as established by virtue of the
court's tacit approval of punitive damages claim in Hoffman . . .
that there is no per se preclusion against awarding punitive dam-
ages where, as here, strict liability under section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts was introduced as plaintiff's theory of
liability." 1 As previously noted, the Hoffman II court specifically
stated that punitive damages could not be granted for Hoffman's
strict liability claim:
[Tihis court finds it inconceivable that in a products liability case the de-
l11. Id.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). See supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1979).




fendant could be shown to have a single consumer in mind when producing
the particular item. To conclude that this particular victim may collect pu-
nitive damages ... is folly. Sterling's intentional wrongdoing, or wanton
misconduct, if any, was not done with the plaintiff Hoffman in mind." 6
Punitive damages have been awarded in Pennsylvania since the
eighteenth century. 1 7 However, no Pennsylvania court has ever,
since the adoption of section 402A of the Restatement by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Webb v. Zern, granted punitive
damages to a plaintiff on a strict liability claim." 8 The Martin
court's opinion by Justice Hutchinson confirms this.119 While the
Martin court felt that the quality of the evidence did not warrant
a decision on this issue, it does not appear that Pennsylvania
would permit the award of punitive damages, based on the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's recent decision in Feld v. Merriam. 
1 20
In Feld, the court held that punitive damages could properly be
awarded against a landlord for the landlord's failure to protect his
tenants from the foreseeable criminal activities of third parties.
121
The Feld court emphasized that the actor's state of mind towards
the person owed the duty of protection would be the most relevant
consideration of a punitive damages claim.1 22 As such, the court
must determine that "[t]he act, or the failure to act, [was] inten-
tional, reckless or malicious. ' 1 23 Under this standard, the Feld
116. 374 F. Supp. at 856.
117. Walker v. Butz, 1 Yeates 574 (1795).
118. Two recent comments confirm that prior to the instant case, no Pennsylvania
court has determined whether punitive damages are available to a strict liability plaintiff.
See Comment, The Dubious Extension of Punitive Damage Recovery in Pennsylvania
Products Liability Law, 23 Duq. L. Rev. 681, 688 (1985) ("The opinion of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp. is the first reported Pennsylvania deci-
sion in which an appellate court has held that a plaintiff may collect punitive damages
against a manufacturer in a products liability action"); Markham, The Imposition of Puni-
tive Damages in Product Liability Actions in Pennsylvania, 57 Temp. L. Q. 203, 210-11
(1984) ("Although commentators have debated the wisdom of permitting punitive damages
in product liability suits, a majority of courts that have addressed the issue have permitted
such awards. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not decided the question. Recently,
however, in Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., the Pennsylvania Superior Court. . .held that
punitive damages may be awarded in product liability actions.")
119. 508 Pa. 165-66, 494 A.2d at 1094-95. Justice Hutchinson stated that: "[Tihe qual-
ity of evidence here presented makes it unnecessary and inappropriate for us to consider
either the broad policy arguments or the legal theory the parties present supporting a blan-
ket rule for or against the allowance of punitive damages in litigation involving mass-mar-
keted products." Id.
120. 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
121. Id. at 395, 485 A.2d at 747.
122. Id. at 396, 485 A.2d at 748.
123. Id.
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court appears to mirror Judge Herman's opinion in Hunter II that
punitive damages cannot be awarded where the required reckless
indifference is not directed at an individual, or at least a specific
group of individuals.
In Pennsylvania, strict liability cases fall into two main catego-
ries: manufacturing defect cases and design defect cases. "Failure
to warn" cases have been characterized under Pennsylvania law as
design defect cases.124 Under either type of case, the manufacturer
is held to be a guarantor of the product's performance and
safety.125 In a design defect case, Pennsylvania courts apply a risk-
utility analysis to determine whether a defendant is liable; liability
may be imposed only on proof that the product lacked an element
necessary to make the product safe for its intended use. 2 ' Where
the contention is that the product was defective because of the ab-
sence of warnings, the plaintiff must show that the absence of
warnings rendered the article substantially dangerous. 27
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the focus of a
strict liability action is the product itself. As such, punitive dam-
ages would never be awarded in a strict liability action under
Pennsylvania law. The Feld decision highlights the fact that the
actor's state of mind should be the focus of any determination as
to the necessity of awarding punitive damages, as the acts must be
"intentional, reckless or malicious."' 28 Further, the Martin court
reiterates that recklessness can only be found where the actor de-
liberately acts in the face of a known risk "in conscious disregard
of, or indifference to, [the] risk" of harm to others.129 Clearly, since
the focus of each action lie on different planes, it does not seem
sound to argue that Pennsylvania will allow punitive damages in a
strict liability action in the near future.
The Martin court affirms that Pennsylvania law does not, as of
yet, allow an award of punitive damages in a strict liability action.
Therefore, the Martin decision is important because it gives fed-
eral courts a proper guideline for the application of Pennsylvania
law concerning the awarding of punitive damages in strict liability
124. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) (defect exists because the
user was not adequately instructed on the proper usage of the product as the product was
designed).
125. Darnbacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 53, 485 A.2d 408, 426 (1984).
126. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Co., 462 Pa. 83, 94, 337 A.2d 893, 898 (1975).
127. 336 Pa. Super. at 57, 485 A.2d at 427.
128. 506 Pa. at 396, 485 A.2d at 748.
129. 508 Pa. at 171, 494 A.2d at 1097.
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actions. This is apparently necessary since the Thomas court failed
to properly conclude that punitive damages could not be awarded
in a strict liability action under Pennsylvania law, while the Neal
court actually allowed such damages based on its perception of
Pennsylvania law.
In Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 30 the Supreme Court held that fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity must adjudicate controversies as
would a state court sitting in the forum state. 131 Significantly, dis-
trict courts sitting in diversity must apply both the statutory and
the case law of a particular form.' 32
Although it was initially held by the Supreme Court that federal
courts sitting in diversity were required to follow all judicial deci-
sions of the particular forum state, 33 subsequent cases have taken
a more liberal view of the deference to be afforded to state court
decision by federal courts sitting in diversity. In King v. Order of
Travelers,13 4 the Supreme Court held that federal courts need not
follow the decisions of state trial courts. 3 5 However, in Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co. of America,136 the Supreme Court held that the
Supreme Court of Vermont's most recent decision on an issue,
though forty-five years old, must be followed by a federal court
where "there appears to be no confusion in the [state] decisions, no
developing line of authorities that cast a shadow over the estab-
lished ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of
judges on the question, [and] no legislative development that
promises to undermine the judicial rule.' 3- 7 The Court did, how-
ever, imply that where a state's law is not so settled, a federal dis-
trict court need not blindly follow the state court decisions.1
38
One of the most recent pronouncements with respect to the def-
130. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Six Companies v. Joint Hwy. Dist., 311 U.S. 180 (1940); West v. A.T.& T. Co., 311
U.S. 223 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Fields, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
134. 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
135. Id.
136. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
137. Id. at 205. The Court stated:
[The] case was decided in 1910. But it was agreed on oral argument that there is no
later authority from the Vermont courts, that no fracture in the rules announced in
those cases has appeared in subsequent rulings or dicta, and that no legislative move-
ment is under way in Vermont to change the result of those cases.
Id. at 204.
138. Id. at 205.
1987
Duquesne Law Review
erence to be afforded state court decisions by federal courts sitting
in diversity is contained in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch.139 In
Bosch, the decedent created a revocable trust under New York
law.140 After the decedent's death, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue determined that the trust did not qualify for the marital
deduction under I.R.C. § 2056.1 1 The Commissioner determined
that the trust was invalid, subsequent to a New York trial court
determination that the trust was valid under New York law. The
Bosch court held that:
under some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an in-
termediate state appellate court ruling .... [W]hen the application of a
federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an under-
lying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling . . . [as] the
underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the state's
highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no decision by
that court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state
law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the
state." 2
While the Bosch decision grants federal courts the power to sit
as a state court and predict how a state's highest court would ulti-
mately decide a particular issue, the Neal, Thomas and Hoffman I
courts overstepped this authority. As noted earlier, no Pennsylva-
nia court on any level has addressed the issue of whether punitive
damages are available to a strict liability plaintiff. 4 3 The Thomas
court even acknowledges that no Pennsylvania court has ever de-
cided the issue. 44 Therefore, the Bernhardt decision should be
controlling, since there is no developing case law on the issue. The
danger of the position taken by the courts in Neal, Thomas and
Hoffman I, is the potentiality for the creation of an environment
conducive to forum shopping. In essence, strict liability plaintiffs
could recover punitive damages in federal courts sitting in Penn-
sylvania even though Pennsylvania state courts have specifically
denied such awards to strict liability plaintiffs. As the intention of
Erie and its progeny was to prevent this exact type of forum shop-
ping, a decision to award punitive damages in strict liability ac-
tions should be determined by Pennsylvania courts. To hold other-
139. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 458.
142. Id. at 465.
143. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
144. 414 F. Supp. at 264 n.13.
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wise violates the edict of Bosch that a federal court sitting in
diversity must act as would a state court of the particular forum.
145
Unless the position taken by the courts in Neal, Thomas and Hoff-
man I is recanted, the federal courts will be sitting as a super-
legislature, which the Constitution forbids.
William A. Weiler
145. 387 U.S. 456.
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